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Abstract
We compare three notions of genericity of separable metric structures. Our analysis provides a general model theoretic technique
of showing that structures are generic in descriptive set theoretic (topological) sense and in measure theoretic sense. In particular,
it gives a new perspective on Vershik’s theorems on genericity and randomness of Urysohn’s space among separable metric spaces.
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1. Introduction
There are several ways to define the notion of a “generic” metric structure. In this article we compare the model
theoretic and two topological approaches to this question.
This work was motivated by Anatoly Vershik’s results on genericity and randomness of the Urysohn space among
separable metric spaces, Theorems 1 and 2 in [6]. Vershik considers the collection of all separable metric spaces as a
topological space, let us call it S. Some elements of S are (isometric to) the Urysohn space. Vershik shows that this
set is Gδ dense in S, which leads to the conclusion that the Urysohn space is in a sense “a generic” separable metric
space. Then he shows that for any “reasonable” probability measure on S, the collection of metric spaces isometric
to the Urysohn space is of measure 1. This leads to the conclusion that the Urysohn space is in a sense “the random”
metric space.
In his talk at the workshop on the Urysohn space at Ben-Gurion University (May 2006), Vershik said that his results
had been motivated by model theoretic properties of the (countable) random graph, and that the theorems in [6] are in
some sense the analogues of the appropriate facts in classical model theory, although the context is different: instead
of countable structures one deals with topological spaces of cardinality the continuum. In this paper we aim to show
that the analogy goes much farther.
Indeed, countable discrete structures are replaced in this context with separable metric spaces, so classical model
theory is not the appropriate general framework. We would like to convince the reader that there exists a natural
generalization of discrete first order logic to the continuous context, in which Vershik’s results are the true analogues
of classical facts, the Urysohn space is an analogue of the random graph, and discrete countable models are no
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space discovered by Vershik are much more than results inspired by certain similarities between this structure and
the random graph; in a sense, both of these are particular cases of the same model theoretic phenomenon, which we
intend to describe here.
Continuous first order logic, recently introduced by Itaï Ben-Yaacov and the author in [3], allows one to study
classes of metric spaces (maybe equipped with continuous extra-structure, e.g. a collection of uniformly continuous
functions from the spaces to R) from model theoretic point of view. Once working in this context, many results
in classical model theory generalize to analytic structures. This paper is devoted to the connection between model
theory and descriptive set theory, which is very well-developed in the classical context, i.e. studying Polish spaces of
countable structures for a given countable signature, countable models of a countable universal theory, etc. We will
refer the reader to the excellent expository paper by Greg Hjorth, [5].
In addition to generalizing Vershik’s theorem to a broad collection of classes of metric structures, our work gen-
eralizes a few basic concepts and results from classical first order model theory to the continuous context and pushes
out the boundaries of possible applications of continuous logic. So although we intentionally try to make the article
accessible to non-logicians, it could also be of interest to model theorists.
Working in the context of continuous first model theory, we adapt some basic facts and techniques from [5] and
show how one defines a Polish topology on the space of e.g. all separable models of a certain universal continuous
theory. Having done that, we discuss three different notions of genericity of a structure. One is model theoretic,
genericity of a model of a universal theory among its peers. The other two are topological, genericity of a structure
as an element of the appropriate Polish space in two different ways: in the sense of Baire category theory and in the
sense of measure theory. Let us state things more precisely.
Let K be a “reasonable” class of separable metric structures. In our context K will normally be the class of all
separable models of a certain universal continuous first order theory. From the model theoretic point of view, a generic
structure in K is a structure in which “anything that can happen” in K happens. Such structures are called “existentially
closed” for K . We will give precise definitions later.
On the other hand, one can consider K as a Polish space (i.e. there is a natural topology on K with respect to
which K is a complete separable metric space). One can call a structure “generic” for K in topological sense if its
isomorphism class is a “big” subset of K . One natural notion of “bigness” in this context is Gδ dense. Another one
comes from measure theory: one can consider natural measures on the space K and ask what are the sets of measure 1.
In this article we have several primary goals:
(i) Introduce the general model theoretic framework and the relevant notion of genericity.
(ii) Construct the Polish space of separable metric structures.
(iii) Connect the notions of genericity. More precisely, we explain how a model theoretic notion of genericity gives
rise to Gδ dense sets in the appropriate Polish space S and sets of measure 1 with respect to any “reasonable”
probability measure on S. In particular, this provides a powerful general technique for showing that certain
structures are topologically generic and random (as it allows us to use well-developed model theoretic tools for
this purpose).
(iv) Conclude with some examples. In particular, we discuss model theory of Urysohn space and show that our results
generalize Vershik’s theorems on its “topological” genericity.
2. Preliminaries and basics
2.1. Continuous logic
Continuous first order logic was introduced in [3] and developed further by Itaï Ben-Yaacov, Alexander Berenstein,
C. Ward Henson and the author. We refer the reader to [1] for a detailed exposition. We will now try to summarize
some important basic notions, facts and notations.
Just as in classical predicate logic, one starts with a fixed signature (vocabulary) τ . In this paper, τ will be count-
able. A signature (vocabulary) is a collection of function symbols and predicate symbols as well as continuity moduli
for all these symbols. There is a distinguished predicate symbol d(x, y), which will correspond to the metric.
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uous first order τ -formulae. As in classical first order logic, formulae are constructed by induction using connectives
and quantifiers. Any countable collection of continuous functions from [0,1]k to [0,1] (for any k) which is dense
in the set of all such continuous functions can be taken as the set of connectives. We will assume that the following
functions are among our connectives:
(i) The constant function q for every q ∈ [0,1] ∩Q;
(ii) Pointwise minimum ([0,1]2 → [0,1]);
(iii) Pointwise maximum ([0,1]2 → [0,1]);
(iv) Multiplication by q , [x → x · q], for every q ∈ [0,1] ∩Q ([0,1] → [0,1]);
(v) Negation, [x → 1 − x], ([0,1] → [0,1]);
(vi) Dotminus or implication: Truncated (at 0) minus [(x, y) → x−˙y] ([0,1]2 → [0,1]);
(vii) Truncated (at 1) plus [(x, y) → x + y] ([0,1]2 → [0,1]);
(viii) (x, y) → |x − y| ([0,1]2 → [0,1]).
Of course, some of the functions above can be defined using the others, but we are not looking for “minimal”
systems of connectives here.
The continuous quantifiers are infx and supx . As in classical first order logic, we only allow quantification over
elements.
So the following are examples of formulae:
• d(x, y);
• d(x, y)−˙d(y, x);
• infx,y d(x, y);
• supx,y,z(d(x, z)−˙(d(x, y)+ d(y, z))).
As usual, formulae with no “free variables” (i.e. each variable is in a scope of one of the quantifiers) are called
sentences. The first two formulae above are not sentences, while the last two are.
An L-pre-structure is a set M equipped with interpretations for all τ -symbols such that d is interpreted as a
pseudometric, each predicate symbol is interpreted as a function from (some power of) M to [0,1], each function
symbol is interpreted as a function from (some power of) M to M , and all of them respect their continuity moduli
with respect to d . In other words:
• dM :M2 → [0,1] is a pseudometric;
• For every n-ary predicate symbol P , we have PM :Mn → [0,1] uniformly continuous with respect to d (respect-
ing the continuity modulus of P dictated by τ );
• For every n-ary function symbol f , we have fM :Mn → M uniformly continuous with respect to d (respecting
the continuity modulus of f dictated by τ ).
A structure is a pre-structure in which d is a complete metric.
See [3] or [1] for more details (on e.g. continuity moduli). Formal definitions of these notions are not important
for us here; but it is crucial that the interpretation of each predicate symbol and of each function symbol is uniformly
continuous, and uniformly so in all L-structures (this is what we need the continuity moduli for). Uniform continuity
allows us to take ultraproducts of L-structures and obtain e.g. compactness of first order continuous logic.
Note that given a structure M , one can easily define (by induction) the M-value of ϕ for any sentence ϕ. We will
denote this value by ϕM (it is a real number in the interval [0,1]).
Note also that there is no particular importance for the interval [0,1], but every predicate symbol must have bounded
range (again, so that ultraproducts will work), and by rescaling we may assume it is in fact always [0,1].
A condition is a statement concerning the value of a sentence ϕ. For example, ϕ  ε, ϕ = 0, ϕ < ε are conditions
(where ε ∈ [0,1]). We will call conditions of the form ϕ  ε, ϕ = 0, etc., closed conditions and those of the form
ϕ < ε, etc., open conditions.
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supx can be viewed as analogues of the existential and the universal quantifiers respectively.
It is clear what it means for a structure M to satisfy a condition α, and we write M |= α. If every structure which
satisfies α also satisfies β , we say that β follows from α and write α |= β . If Λ is a collection of conditions and M is
a structure, we say that M is a model for (of) Λ if M satisfies every condition in Λ, and write M |= Λ.
A theory T is a collection of closed conditions which is consistent (i.e. there is a structure M which satisfies all the
conditions in T , M |= T ). We will always assume that theories are closed under entailment, i.e. if α ∈ T and α |= β ,
then β ∈ T . We denote by Mod(T ) the class of all models of T .
We encourage the reader to have a look at examples of continuous languages and theories presented in [3] and [1].
We shall not discuss ultraproduct constructions in this paper. Again, curious readers are referred to [3] or [1]. An
important consequence is the Compactness Theorem for continuous logic, which will be useful for us:
Fact 2.1 (Compactness Theorem). Let Λ be a collection of closed conditions which is finitely satisfiable (i.e. every
finite subset of Λ has a model). Then Λ has a model.
Let M ⊆ N be L-structures. We say that M is an elementary submodel of N (M ≺ N ) if for every L-sentence ϕ we
have ϕM = ϕN . We say that a theory T is model complete if for every M,N |= T , M ⊆ N ⇒ M ≺ N . Most theories
are not model complete; we will discuss this notion more later. T is model complete if (but not only if) it eliminates
quantifiers; see more in [3] or [1].
Note that continuous first order logic is a natural generalization of classical first order logic. Indeed, every classical
first order theory can be viewed as a continuous theory in which the metric is discrete.
2.2. Polish space of separable continuous structures
Let τ be a fixed countable continuous vocabulary. For simplicity we assume that τ is relational (i.e. no function
symbols). Let L be the corresponding (countable) continuous language. We denote the space of all L-continuous
separable structures M with a distinguished countable dense subset N ⊆ M by S. Consider the following topology
on S: basic open sets are of the form Uϕ(x¯),a¯,ε = Uϕ(a¯),ε = {M ∈ S: ϕM(a¯) < ε} where ϕ(x¯) is a quantifier free
L-formula, a¯ ∈N, ε ∈ [0,1] ∪ {∞}.
Proposition 2.2. S with the topology above is a Polish space.
Proof. Let 〈Ri : i < ω〉 be an enumeration of τ , R0 being the metric. Let ki be the arity of Ri (so k0 = 2).
By Section 2 of [5] the product space
X = [0,1]
⊔
i N
ki
is Polish. We can view S as a subspace of X via the following embedding φ : S → X: φ(M) = 〈fi : i < ω〉 such that
fi is precisely RMi on the dense subset N of M .
Note that the fact that R0 is a pseudometric and all the rest of the predicates respect the appropriate continuity
moduli with respect to it is a collection of closed conditions. The fact that R0 is an actual metric can be expressed as
a collection of open conditions. So S can be viewed as a Gδ subset of a Polish space, and therefore, by Lemma 2.2
in [5], S is a Polish space itself. 
Let T be an L-theory. We denote the space of all elements of S which are models of T by ST . So S = S∅.
2.3. Universal theories and existentially closed models
Definition 2.3.
(i) We call a theory universal if it is (the closure under entailment of) a collection of conditions of the form
[supx¯ ϕ(x¯) = 0] where ϕ is quantifier free.
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M ⊆ N ∈ K , a quantifier free formula ϕ(x, y¯) and a tuple b¯ ∈ M , we have infMx ϕ(x, b¯) = infNx ϕ(x, b¯).
(iii) If T is a universal theory we say that M |= T is existentially closed for T if it is existentially closed for K =
Mod(T ). When T is clear from the context we omit it and say “M is existentially closed” or “M is an e.c.
structure” or “M is an e.c. model”.
Remark 2.4. For M ∈ K , to be existentially closed for K means in a sense that anything which is quantifier free
definable with parameters in M , that can happen in some model in K , happens already in M . In this sense, existentially
closed models are “generic” among structures in K .
Example 2.5.
(i) Atomless probability algebras are existentially closed among all probability algebras (see [3] or [1]).
(ii) Hilbert spaces equipped with a unitary operator U with full spectrum (Spec(U) = S1) are e.c. among all Hilbert
spaces equipped with a unitary operator, see [4].
(iii) Atomless probability algebras with an aperiodic automorphism are e.c. among probability algebras equipped
with an automorphism, see [2].
Let T be a universal theory, K = Mod(T ), and Kec be the class of e.c. models of T . We call Kec the con-
tinuous Robinson theory of T . One may ask: is Kec elementary (i.e. is there a continuous theory T ∗ such that
Kec = Mod(T ∗))? The answer is not always positive, even in the classical (discrete) context. For example, the Robin-
son theory of groups (i.e. T is collection of first order sentences which are true in all groups, K is the class of all
groups, and Kec consists of all groups which are existentially closed) is not elementary. But often the answer is yes;
in this case we say that T admits a model companion and call T ∗ the model companion of T .
It is easy to see that in this case T ∗ is model complete: if M,N |= T ∗ and M ⊆ N , then M ≺ N . It does not
necessarily eliminate quantifiers; if it does, we call it the model completion of T .
Remark 2.6. In Example 2.5 above, the classes of e.c. models are in fact elementary, and the appropriate theories are
the model companions, and even the model completions of the universal theories.
Observation 2.7. Let T be a universal theory. Then ST is a closed subset of S, and therefore a Polish space.
Proof. Clear. 
The following fact is well-known, but the author is not aware of a written reference. Although the proof is identical
to that of the classical (discrete) analogue, we include it for completeness. In order not to scare the reader, we only
deal with separable structures, which is all we need in this article (the proof for an arbitrary infinite cardinality is
essentially the same).
Fact 2.8. Let T be a universal theory, M |= T separable. Then there exists a separable N ⊇ M , N |= T , N is e.c.
for T .
Proof. The proof is standard and resembles very much the construction of the algebraic closure of a given field.
Let M0 = M . We construct separable Mi |= T for i < ω by induction as follows:
Given Mi let 〈ϕα(x¯α): α < ω〉 be an enumeration of all quantifier free formulae ϕ(x¯) with parameters in Mi . Now
define a sequence Mαi of separable models of T by induction on α < ω as follows:
• M0i = Mi ;• Given Mαi , if there is no a¯ ∈ Mi satisfying [ϕα(a¯) = 0], but there exists M ′ ⊇ Mαi , M ′ |= T where such a¯ exists,
let Mα+1i be any such separable M ′ (for the cardinality preservation one can use e.g. Proposition 7.3 in [1]).
Otherwise let Mα+1 = Mα .i i
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ϕ(x¯) with parameters in Mi , an extension M ′ |= T of Mi+1 and a¯ ∈ M ′ satisfying [ϕ(a¯) = 0], then such a¯ exists
already in Mi+1.
Finally, let N =⋃i<ω Mi ; it is easy to check that it is existentially closed. 
3. Inductive theories
Recall that we assume that theories are closed under entailment, i.e. every closed condition which follows from T
is already in T . We denote by T o the collection of all open conditions which follow from T . Let T oc = T ∪ T o.
Let T be an L-theory and let Δ be collection of conditions (open or/and closed). We denote by TΔ the Δ-part of
T . So TΔ = T oc ∩Δ. For an L-structure M , we denote the Δ-part of Th(M) by ThΔ(M).
As usual, we define Σn and Πn formulae by induction on n:
• Σ0 = Π0 = quantifier free formulae;
• Σn+1 is the collection of formulae of the form infx¯ ϕ(x¯, y¯) where ϕ(x¯, y¯) ∈ Πn;
• Πn+1 is the collection of formulae of the form supx¯ ϕ(x¯, y¯) where ϕ(x¯, y¯) ∈ Σn.
Remark 3.1. So Σ1 is the collection of all the existential formulae, Π1 is the collection of all the universal formulae.
Definition 3.2.
(i) For Λ ⊆ L, we denote by Λo the collection of all open conditions of the form ϕ < ε for ϕ ∈ Λ, ε > 0.
(ii) For Λ ⊆ L, we denote by Λc the collection of all closed conditions of the form ϕ  ε for ϕ ∈ Λ, ε > 0.
(iii) Let Δ be a collection of conditions. We call a theory T a Δ-theory if TΔ |= T .
(iv) We call a theory T inductive if it is axiomatizable by open conditions of the form supx¯ infy¯ ϕ(x¯, y¯) < ε, where ϕ
is quantifier-free. So T is inductive if it is a Πo2 -theory.
Remark 3.3.
(i) So a theory T is universal iff it is a Δ-theory for Δ = Πc1 .
(ii) Maybe the reader would expect us to work with Πc2 -theories instead of Πo2 . Note that if T is Πc2 then it is
inductive, and for complete theories the notions are equivalent; but as we want Theorem 3.6 to hold for all
theories, not necessarily complete, and as we want our theories to define Gδ subsets of S, the natural choice is
open conditions.
Lemma 3.4. Let Δ = Σon or Δ = Πon for some n (or just Δ is a collection of open conditions closed under rescaling,
i.e. multiplication by scalars and the “pointwise minimum” connective). Let T be a theory and suppose that for every
two L-structures M,N such that M |= T and ThΔ(M) ⊆ ThΔ(N), we have N |= T . Then T is a Δ-theory.
Proof. Suppose not; so there exists N |= TΔ, N |= T . By the assumption, for no M |= T do we have ThΔ(M) ⊆
ThΔ(N). In other words, for every M |= T there exists a formula ϕM with [ϕM < ε] ∈ Δ such that ϕMM < ε, ϕNM  ε.
By rescaling we may assume ε = 12 .
So the set T ∪{[ϕM  12 ]: M |= T } is inconsistent. By compactness, [minki=1 ϕi < 12 ] ∈ T o for some finite collection
of such ϕi . But Δ is closed under taking minima, and every one of the conditions [ϕi < 12 ] is in Δ, so (as N |= TΔ),
(minki=1 ϕi)N <
1
2 , so for some i ϕ
N
i < ε, a contradiction. 
Lemma 3.5. Let T be a complete L-theory and M an L-structure with ThΣcn (M) ⊆ TΣcn . Then there exists M ′ |= T
and a Σn-elementary embedding f :M → M ′.
Proof. Let M = 〈aα: α < λ〉, M ′ a λ-saturated model of T . Construct fα :Aα = {aβ : β < α} → M ′ an increasing
continuous sequence of Σn-elementary embeddings. Given fα , consider the Σn-type in M of aα over Aα , call it π(x).
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saturation of M ′. 
Theorem 3.6. Let T be an L-theory such that Mod(T ) is preserved under unions of chains, that is if 〈Mi : i < ω〉 is an
increasing chain of models of T , then the closure of the union M =⋃i Mi is also a model of T . Then T is inductive.
Proof. Suppose Mod(T ) is closed under unions of chains. We would like to show that TΠo2 |= T .
Let M |= T and T ′ a complete L-theory extending TΠo2 , N |= T ′ with ThΠo2 (M) ⊆ T ′ We will show that N |= T ,
which clearly suffices by Lemma 3.4.
Construct a chain N0 ⊆ M1 ⊆ N1 ⊆ · · · such that:
(i) N0 = N ;
(ii) Mi |= T , Ni |= T ′;
(iii) Ni ≺ Ni+1.
If the construction is possible, we are done:
Let M =⋃i Mi =⋃i Ni . M |= T by the assumption on T and (ii) above. On the other hand, clearly N0 ≺ M (as
N0 ≺ Ni for all i by (iii) above), so N = N0 |= T , and we are done.
Why is the construction possible?
Let N0 = N . As ThΠo2 (M) ⊆ Th(N) = T ′, we have ThΣc2 (N) ⊆ Th(M), so by Lemma 3.5, there exists M0 |=
Th(M) and a Σc2 -embedding of N0 into M0.
Let N0 = 〈aα: α < λ〉. Enrich the vocabulary τ with λ-many constant symbols, call the new language L′.
Claim 3.6.1. ThΣc1 (M0, 〈aα: α < λ〉) ⊆ Th(N0, 〈aα: α < λ〉) as L′-theories.
Proof. Clearly (as N0 is a Σc2 -elementary submodel of M0), ThΣc2 (N0, 〈aα: α < λ〉) ⊆ Th(M0, 〈aα: α < λ〉) as L′-
theories, and therefore ThΠo2 (M0, 〈aα: α < λ〉) ⊆ Th(N0, 〈aα: α < λ〉) as L′-theories, in particular
ThΣo1
(
M0, 〈aα: α < λ〉
)⊆ Th(N0, 〈aα: α < λ〉) (1)
as L′-theories.
Let [infx¯ ψ(x¯, a¯)  ε] be a closed existential condition satisfied by M0 with parameters a¯ ∈ N0 (i.e. a¯ =
aα1, . . . , aαk for some α1, . . . , αk < λ). Then M0 |= [infx¯ ψ(x¯, a¯) < ε′] for every ε′ > ε. So this is true in N0 (by
(1) above), which completes the proof of the claim. 
By the claim above and Lemma 3.5, there exists N1 |= T ′ into which M0 is Σc1 -embedded in the language L′.
Clearly, this means that N0 ≺ N1.
The rest of the construction is similar. 
We obtain the analogue of a well-known Robinson’s theorem in the continuous context:
Corollary 3.7. If T is model complete, then it is inductive.
Corollary 3.8. Let T be a universal theory which has a model companion T ′. Then T ′ is inductive.
Proof. T ′ is model complete. 
4. Generic and random models
4.1. Model completions and topological genericity
Observation 4.1. Let T ′ be an inductive theory. Then ST ′ is a Gδ subset of S.
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subset of S, which we called Uϕ(a¯,b¯),ε . The open condition [infx¯ ϕ(x¯, b¯) < ε] corresponds, therefore, to an open subset
of S, which equals
⋃
a¯∈NUϕ(a¯,b¯),ε . A Πo2 condition defines a subset of S which is a (countable) intersection (over
all possible b¯ ∈ N) of sets as above; therefore it is a Gδ set. Clearly, a countable collection of Πo2 conditions still
corresponds to a Gδ set. 
Fact 4.2. Let T be a universal theory. Then the collection of separable e.c. models is dense in ST .
Proof. By Fact 2.8 every separable M |= T can be extended to a separable e.c. model M ′ |= T . Now it is easy to see
that one can rename the elements of M ′ such that a certain finite a¯ ∈N remains unchanged (and so M ′ is indeed in a
specified open neighborhood of M in ST ). 
Corollary 4.3. Let T be a universal theory which has a model companion T ′. Then ST ′ is a Gδ dense subset of ST .
Recall that a theory T is called ℵ0-categorical if any two separable models of T are isomorphic.
Definition 4.4. Let T be a universal theory. We call M ∈ ST generic if the isomorphism class of M is Gδ dense
in ST .
Corollary 4.5. Let T be a universal theory which has a model companion T ′, and assume T ′ is ℵ0-categorical. Then
(any) existentially closed model of T is generic in ST .
Proof. By Corollary 4.3, ST ′ is Gδ dense in ST . By ℵ0-categoricity of T ′, ST ′ is the isomorphism class of any e.c.
model of T (which is in ST ). 
4.2. Random structures
Once we have shown that the class of existentially closed models in S is “big” in the sense of Baire category
theory, a natural question is: is there a similar measure-theoretic result? We will provide a weak positive answer.
Let T be a universal theory, μ a probability measure on ST satisfying
Assumption 4.6.
(i) No nonempty open set has probability 0.
(ii) μ is invariant under the action of S∞ on ST . In other words, for every formula ϕ(x¯), ε > 0 and a¯, b¯ ∈N, we have
the equality μ(Uϕ(a¯),ε) = μ(Uϕ(b¯),ε). So μ(Uϕ(a¯),ε) does not depend on a¯.
Clearly, these are very natural assumptions on a measure on ST , once we are interested in “random structures”:
first, we assume that if a certain open event occurs in some model of T , then its probability is positive. Second, we
assume that in a sense isomorphic models “occur” with equal probability.
Lemma 4.7. Let μ be as above. Then the set of all existentially closed structures in ST has probability 1. In other
words, if we pick a structure “randomly”, it is going to be existentially closed almost surely.
Proof. Let M be a randomly chosen structure. We aim to show that with probability 1 it is existentially closed. Let
ϕ(x¯) be a formula, and suppose that in some M ⊆ N |= T we have infNx¯ ϕ(x¯) ε. Let ε′ > ε. So there exists a¯ ∈ N
such that ϕN(a¯) < ε′, and therefore μ(Uϕ(a¯),ε′) = δ > 0. By the invariance of μ, μ(Uϕ(b¯),ε′) = δ for every b¯ ∈N, and
so the probability that in a randomly chosen structure M we have ϕM(b¯) ε′ is bounded away from 1 for each b¯ ∈ M .
Now clearly with probability 1 for some b¯ ∈ M we have ϕM(b¯) < ε′, therefore infMx¯ ϕ(x¯) ε almost surely, and
we are done. 
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is either 0 for all a¯ or bounded away from 0 for all a¯.
Corollary 4.9. Let T be a universal theory which has a model companion T ′. Then ST ′ is a set of probability 1 in ST .
Definition 4.10. We call a separable model of a universal theory T random if the measure of its isomorphism class
in ST is 1 with respect to any probability measure μ as in Assumption 4.6. In other words, M is a random model of T
if for every μ as above, a randomly chosen structure in ST is almost surely isomorphic to M .
Remark. Note that our definition is somewhat weak, because we do not demand existence of a nontrivial measure
satisfying Assumption 4.6. Hence it might be more correct to refer to what we call “random” as “weakly random”,
but since we will not deal with any other notion of randomness in this paper, let us stick to the shorter term. It would
be interesting to investigate stronger concepts of randomness for specific structures and theories (e.g. the Urysoohn
space), and we intend to return to that later. It seems that for the case of Urysohn space, existence of (many) nontrivial
measures as above follow from recent works of Vershik, but the we are unable to provide a specific reference at this
point.
Just like in Corollary 4.5 we obtain:
Corollary 4.11. Let T be a universal theory which has a model companion T ′. Assume furthermore that T ′ is ℵ0-
categorical. Then any separable model of T ′ is a random model of T .
Clearly, this generalizes the “randomness” of the countable random graph; see more in the following subsection.
4.3. Concluding remarks on genericity
In this section we have shown that the model theoretic notion of genericity gives rise to both Baire category
theoretical and measure theoretical notions of genericity in the space S. In other words, we have shown:
Corollary 4.12. Let T be a universal theory which admits a model companion T ′. Then ST ′ is both Gδ dense in S
and of measure 1 with respect to any reasonable measure on S (i.e. any measure satisfying Assumption 4.6).
In particular, we have the following:
Corollary 4.13. Suppose T is a universal theory which has a model companion T ′, and assume furthermore that T ′
is ℵ0-categorical. Then the (unique up to isomorphism) model of T ′ is both the generic and the random model of T .
Example 4.14. The atomless separable probability algebra is both the generic and the random separable probability
algebra.
Proof. The theory of atomless probability algebras is the model companion of the universal theory of probability
algebras by [3]. It is also ℵ0-categorical, so apply Corollary 4.13. 
As we have already mentioned, every classical first order theory is a continuous first order theory with discrete
metric. We can therefore apply our analysis to e.g. the theory of the random graph. Recall that the theory of the
random graph is the model completion of the universal theory of graphs.
Example 4.15. The random graph is the generic countable graph.
Proof. The (classical) first order theory of the random graph is the model completion (and therefore the model
companion) of the universal theory of graphs. It us also ℵ0-categorical. So the desired conclusion follows from Corol-
lary 4.13. 
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graph in the sense defined here in Definition 4.10. Well, no surprise here: we are just saying that the random graph is,
well, random.
In the following section we will show that the continuous first order theory of the Urysohn space has similar
properties, and therefore Corollary 4.13 applies to it as well. One can think of this theory as the continuous analogue
of the theory of the random graph: instead of the discrete predicate R(x, y) in the theory of graphs which can be either
true or false, we have a metric which can take any value between 0 and 1.
In fact, the random graph satisfies much stronger “randomness” properties than our weak definition. As we have
already mentioned, it would be interesting to find out which ones of these properties hold for the Urysohn space. We
will not pursue these questions here.
5. Urysohn space
Many results on the model theory of the Urysohn space here are “folklore”, and have been known to e.g. C. Ward
Henson for a long time, but the author is not aware of any written references. In order to follow the proofs, the reader
should be familiar with basics of continuous model theory slightly beyond what is sketched in Section 2 of the article.
We remind the reader that the Urysohn space is the universal complete separable metric space, first constructed by
Pavel Urysohn. Due to the limitations of the genre, we will consider the bounded Urysohn space, i.e. Urysohn space
of diameter 1. We denote it by U.
Denote by En the collection of all possible distance configurations on n points of diameter 1. It will be convenient
for us to think about it in the following way: ϑ(x1, . . . , xn) ∈ En if ϑ(x1, . . . , xn) is a formula of the form∨
1i, jk
∣∣d(xi, xj )− rij ∣∣
where the matrix (rij )1i,jk is a distance matrix of some finite metric space of diameter 1, and ∨ stands for the
lattice operation of pointwise maximum.
Let us introduce the following notation: for ϑ ∈ En+1, let ϑ  n be the restriction of ϑ to the first n variables.
Clearly, for every ϑ ∈ En+1, for every ε > 0 there exists a δ = δ(ε) > 0 such that if a1, . . . , an ∈ U satisfy
ϑ  n(a1, . . . , an) < δ, then there exists an+1 ∈ U such that ϑ(a1, . . . , an, an+1) ε.
Let TU be the collection of all the conditions of the form[
sup
x1,...,xn
inf
y
(
ε
1 − δ
(
1 − ϑ  n(x1, . . . , xn)
)∧ ϑ(x1, . . . , xn, y)
)
 ε
]
which is just one way of stating
∀x1, . . . xn ∃y
(
ϑ  n(x1, . . . , xn) < δ → ϑ(x1, . . . , xn, y) ε
)
.
Note that ∧ stands for the lattice operation of pointwise minimum.
The following follows from the standard Urysohn’s argument:
Fact 5.1. The only separable complete model of TU is U.
Corollary 5.2. TU is ℵ0-categorical, and therefore a complete continuous theory.
Proof. By (the continuous version of) Vaught’s test. 
Proposition 5.3. TU eliminates quantifiers.
Proof. By the classical back-and-forth argument (see Theorem 4.16 in [3]) using the axioms of TU. 
Corollary 5.4. TU is the model completion (and therefore the model companion) of the “empty” continuous universal
theory (the universal theory of a metric space with no extra-structure). U is (the only) existentially closed metric space.
A. Usvyatsov / Topology and its Applications 155 (2008) 1607–1617 1617A natural conclusion from our analysis is the following form of Vershik’s theorems:
Corollary 5.5. The Urysohn space (of diameter 1) is the generic and the random metric space (of diameter 1).
Proof. The theory of the Urysohn space is the model companion of the universal theory of metric spaces and is
ℵ0-categorical, so the result follows immediately from Corollary 4.13. 
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